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A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION
FIVE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) states:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."' Since 1926
federal courts have held that there is no private right of action under
this section, declaring that only the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
could institute an action for its violation.2 The FTCA created the FTC
as an administrative body designed to prevent persons, partnerships or
corporations from engaging in unfair methods of competition. 3  How-
ever, Congress nowhere specified that it was granting exclusive juris-
diction to the FTC to enforce the provisions of the FTCA.4 Rather, it
limited the FTC's authority to the institution of actions when it was in
the "interest of the public." 5
Since the enactment of the original FTCA in 1914,1 and the pas-
sage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment in 1938, 7 there has been an in-
creased awareness of the plight of the consumer. 8  Yet at the present
time there is still no uniform law of unfair competition or deceptive trade
practices which permits consumers to bring an action for private relief
in the federal courts. A construction of section 5 to give private parties
this remedy would enable them to protect themselves in today's market-
place. The doctrine of caveat emptor, so prevalent at the time of the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
2. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
4. See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987,
988 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Bunn] Professor Bunn's argument that the FTCA
did not give the FTC exclusive jurisdiction of cases arising under its terms is described
as persuasive in Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, 180 F.2d 200, 202 n.1 (7th Cir.
1950).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
6. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §2 41-58 (1964)).
7. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964)).
8. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963); J. CARPER &
W. MAGNUSON, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE (1968); J. GRAHAM, ENEMIES
OF THE POOR (1970); S. MARGOLIUs, THE INNOCENT CONSUMERS V. THE EXPLOITERS
(1967); Maclntyre & von Brand, Unfair Methods of Competition As An Evolving
Concept-Prelude To Consumerism, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 597 (1969); Comment,
The Consumer Fraud Information Gap, 49 ORE. L. REV. 421 (1969); Note, Consumer
Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
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passage of the original FTCA,9 can no longer be the credo of the fed-
eral courts if they are to play a meaningful role in giving vitally needed
protection to the consumer. This Note will examine the necessity for
implying a private right of action under section 5 and will argue that all
previous cases holding to the contrary are no longer controlling.
An Analysis of Previous Cases
The question of a private right of action under section 5 has been
litigated frequently. Since the enactment of the original FTCA almost
60 years ago, business competitors have sought to bring actions under
section 5 to prevent unfair competition among themselves, but courts
have been unanimous in holding that Congress did not intend to afford
these litigants any private relief. However, since the passage of the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment,"° which broadened the coverage of the
FTCA to include consumers, the federal courts have never had to decide
whether an individual consumer could seek private relief under sec-
tion 5. In all of the cases discussed below, the question for decision
was whether a competitor could sue under the FTCA.
In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange," a 1926 case that is
most frequently cited for the proposition that section 5 affords no pri-
vate relief, the Court dismissed the question of a private action in these
few words:
There is an attempt to allege unfair methods of competition,
which may be put aside at once, since relief in such cases under the
Trade Commission Act must be afforded in the first instance by
the commission.'"
The Court cited no authority to support this holding: it simply gave a
literal-and narrow--construction to the 1914 Act. However, the right
to sue under section 5 was really not necessary, because the federal
courts had developed a federal common law"5 of unfair competition un-
der which individuals had a private right of action. 4 Because most
9. E. Cox, R. FELLMETM- & J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NADER REPORT]; see Mindell, The
New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its Consumer
Protection Activities, 11 N.Y.L.F. 603 (1965) where he quotes Attorney General Louis
J. Lefkowitz: "We believe that the old axiom of caveat emptor must be restated to
say: let the merchant take the responsibility to explain his product in the frankest
terms and deal openly and honestly with the consumer."
10. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964)).
11. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
12. Id. at 603.
13. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which permitted the fed-
eral courts to develop their own common law. This case, however, was overruled by
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. See Bunn, supra note 4, at 990.
May 19711 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
unfair competition cases involved diversity of citizenship among the
parties,1 5 they were usually brought in the federal courts. 6 Thus, the
federal common law was adequate to dispose of these suits. At the time
Moore was decided, there was no need for a further private right of
action under section 5.
Moore and subsequent cases denying private relief under section 5
were actions to prevent unfair methods of competition among busi-
nesses. In all cases, the courts applied the Moore construction of the
FTCA. In National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 7 for
example, the court stated: "I believe it cannot fairly be said that Con-
gress [in passing section 5] went further and . . . authorized federal
courts to develop a rounded federal common law of unfair competi-
tion." 8  The court added that it is for the legislature, not for the
judiciary, to develop a federal law of unfair competition. 9 Samson
Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, Inc.,20 relying on Moore and Na-
tional Fruit Product Co., held: "The Federal Trade Commission Act
while declaring certain acts and practices unlawful, gives no right of
action to private litigants based on such unlawful acts.'
Nor have the federal courts changed their interpretation of section
5 in recent cases. In two unfair competition actions brought by com-
peting businesses, Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Electric Products,
Inc.2 2 and La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick and Henderson,
Inc.,-3 the court dismissed the claim of private relief by saying that the
FTC had original jurisdiction. For this proposition the courts relied
on Moore and Samson Crane.
Thus, all cases denying relief stem from Moore v. New York Cot-
ton Exchange,24 which offered no rationale for its holding. Moreover,
15. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. Rv. 1289, 1299 (1940) [herein-
after cited as Chafee].
16. Id.; Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act, 23
OHIO ST. L.J. 110, 113 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]; Note, The Choice of
Law in Multistate Unfair Competition: A Legal-Industrial Enigma, 60 HARV. L. REV.
1315, 1316 (1947).
17. 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942).
18. Id. at 504.
19. Id. Professor Charles Bunn advanced the proposition that section 5 was in
fact a national law of unfair competition. Bunn, supra note 4, at 988-89. Judge
Henry Friendly found Bunn's thesis to be intriguing and of considerable appeal. He
suggested that it had not caught on "perhaps for no better reason than that no one had
thought of it for thirty years." Friendly, In Praise of Erie and the New Federal
Common Law, 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 87 (1964).
20. 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949).
21. Id. at 221.
22. 242 F. Supp. 302, 306 (N.D. 111. 1965).
23. 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
24. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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all actions were for unfair methods of competition among competing
businesses. A private consumer's claim for relief under section 5 after
the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment 25 has never been litigated.
In 1938 Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the
FTCA to protect the consuming public from unfair practices. Thus,
it broadened the 1914 Act which had protected honest businessmen
from unlawful competitive practices. 26  The 1938 Amendment added
the words: "unfair or deceptive acts of practices in commerce [are
unlawful] '27 to the 1914 Act. Failure of the new phrase to use the
word "competition" implied that Congress intended to give protection
to the consumer,28 thus placing him on a par with the businessman from
the standpoint of protection from deceptive practices.
29
A consumer would be seeking relief under that provision of
section 5 which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." There-
fore, the unfair competition cases would not be controlling. Courts
would have to consider a consumer's action for unfair trade practices
in light of congressional intent in passing the Wheeler-Lea Amendment
to protect consumers. Furthermore, the courts, which are policy-
making institutions, should also take judicial notice of the consumer's
present, largely defenseless, position. 8°
It is at least arguable that the federal courts could construe the
FTCA in the following manner: The FTCA makes unlawful unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
The FTC may bring an action only when it is in the public interest to
do so, but the consumer may also take advantage of its protection to
birng an action for private relief.
Necessity of a Private Right of Action Under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act
At the present time consumer protection is limited largely to the
FTC's enforcement of section 5 and available remedies under state law.
Both, however, offer only limited and, in most cases, inadequate pro-
tection.
25. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964)).
26. 83 CONG. Rnc, 391-92 (1947) (remarks of Senator Lea). See Koch v. FTC,
206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
28. Note, The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 259,
262 (1939); Note, The Consumer and Federal Regulation of Advertising, 53 HAv.
L. REv. 828, 837 (1940).
29. See MaIntyre, supra note 8, at 612; see also Charlton & Fawcett, The FTC
and False Advertising, 17 KAN. L. REV. 599, 608 (1969).
30. See text accompanying notes 31-103 infra.
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A. Available State Remedies
Today most actions for unfair methods of competition and decep-
tive trade practices are brought in federal court because of the diversity
of citizenship of the parties affected. 3 Nonetheless, federal courts,
under the compulsion of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,32 must apply
state substantive law in diversity actions because of the lack of an ap-
plicable federal statute. 33
1. State Common Law Remedies
The common law of the various states is presently not able to pro-
tect consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
Since prior to Erie most cases were litigated in federal courts which
applied federal common law, many of the states never had the oppor-
tunity to develop their own common law of deceptive trade practices.
The available case law which the federal courts had to apply after Erie
was very old34 and of doubtful present applicability.35 In fact, deci-
sional law was usually lacking in states without large commercial cen-
ters.36  Advocating private legal recourse for the consumer, the Har-
vard Journal of Legislation said that existing state common law
may not provide a private remedy where there is no private right
of action for unfair and deceptive trade practices. While there
are possible legal theories for dealing with fraud and misrepre-
sentation on the part of sellers, they may be unrealistic when
applied to unsophisticated consumers, and even where they are
theoretically available, without legislation, they require the ad-
mittedly slow evolution of the common law.17
The primary remedy available to the consumer under the common
law is an action for deceit. However, the plaintiff must prove that
(1) he has reasonably relied on 38 the (2) misrepresentation" (3) of
31. Diamond, supra note 16, at 113; Note, supra note 16, at 1316.
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. Id. at 71-80; see Chafee, supra note 15, at 1299; Diamond, supra note 16, at
112; Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, 42 COLUM. L. RE. 955 (1942); Note, supra note 16, at 1316.
34. Diamond, supra note 16, at 113.
35. Note, supra note 16, at 1316-17.
36. See Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 200, 201-02 (1949); Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act: Another Step Toward a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 1005, 1007 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dole].
37. An Act To Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, 7 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 122, 147 (1969); see Comment, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in
North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 897 n.4 (1970).
38. Note, State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 IOWA L. REv. 710, 712
(1967).
39. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 700 (3d ed. 1964) [herein-
after cited as PROSSER]; Note, supra note 38, at 712.
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a fact (as contrasted with a statement of opinion) 40 that has been
knowingly made by a merchant"' (5) with intent to deceive 42 (6) and
has resulted in harm to the consumer.4 3
The difficulties encountered in proving each of these elements have
proven to be an almost insurmountable obstacle for the average con-
sumer.4 4  This hurdle is compounded by the necessity of proving legal
damages.4 5  Moreover, if damages are not foreseebale,4 6 recovery
will be denied. Finally, the majority of states require proof of legal
malice (an aggravated form of conduct) for recovery of exemplary
damages.4 7
2. Existing State Consumer Legislation
Although a few states have modeled their consumer legislation
after section 5 of the FTCA,48 most consumer protection statutes are
not sufficiently comprehensive to provide complete protection, 49 es-
pecially in light of the extensive range of deceptive trade practices that
40. Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 23 (1929)
[hereinafter cited as Handler]; see PRossnn at 700.
41. PROSSER at 700; Note, supra note 38, at 712; see Note, Can the Kentucky Con-
sumer Ever Forget Caveat Emptor and Find True Happiness? 58 KY. L.J. 325, 345
(1970).
42. PROSSER at 700; Note, supra note 38, at 712.
43. PROSSER at 700; Handler, supra note 40, at 23.
44. Note, Fair Packaging, Fair Labeling and the Federal Trade Commission: An
Exercise in Consumer Protection, 1 GA. L. REv. 525, 526 (1967); Note, supra note 38, at
713; see Dole, supra note 36, at 1015; Handler, The Control of False Advertising
Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 91 (1939); Lorenz, Consumer
Fraud and the San Diego District Attorney's Office, 8 U. SAN DIEGo L. REv. 47, 48
(1971); Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, 54 IowA L.
REv. 319, 321 (1968); see also Handler, supra note 40, at 27 where he says: "It is
apparent that the traditional actions of deceit and warranty as developed by the courts
can be of little utility in a campaign against false advertising. There are not many
signs at present that the common law in this field possesses sufficient capacity for
growth to originate a new cause of action on the cases for damages flowing from
false statements contained in advertising."
45. PROSSER at 747-48; see Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Con-
tracts-Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy, 1968 DuKE LJ. 831, 862.
46. PRossER at 748.
47. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IowA L. REv.
307, 321 (1969).
48. HAWAi REV. STATS. § 480-2 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a)
(Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2453(a) (Supp. 1970); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (Supp. 1965).
49. Morse, A Consumer's View of FTC Regulation of Advertising, 17 K&N. L.
REv. 639, 649 (1969), where the author states: "To date, too many states remain
without adequate consumer protection laws .... How rapidly states will develop a
positive commitment to the consumer remains to be seen"; Rice, Remedies, Enforcement
Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559,
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has arisen in recent years.5" The following survey is not exhaustive; it
is intended only to suggest that consumer legislation is in its infancy,
and that the protection it affords is haphazard at best.
Although numerous states have passed consumer legislation in the
past few years, most efforts to control deceptive trade practices are
deficient. For example, many of the consumer protection statutes at-
tempt to categorize the complex field of deceptive trade practices into
narrow categories. Several states, including Connecticut, Georgia,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Rhode Island and Texas have modeled their
legislation after the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,"' which
defines twelve categories of unfair or deceptive trade practices.52 Simi-
larly, California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act,53 operative January
1, 1971, attempts to classify deceptive trade practices in sixteen statu-
tory provisions.54 Thus, when a deceptive practice does not fall within
a specific classification, 55 the consumer is left unprotected. The result
is that the "legislation [is] of little avail against the imagination of the
proverbial flim-flam man."56
Nor do state laws passed on a piecemeal basis afford adequate
protection. Oregon, for example,57 has statutes covering interest and
usury,58 retail installment contracts, 9 fake sales, 0 and various specific
deceptive trade practices."' This fragmentary approach leaves the con-
sumer virtually unprotected against practices that do not come within
the often narrow provisions of the various statutes. States which lack a
sufficiently broad statute-such as section 562 -that covers the in-
610 (1968) says: "Too much of the recently enacted legislation appears to have been
considered with only a partial picture of consumer injury problems." In regard to re-
tail sales legislation, see Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 414 (1966).
50. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49
B.U.L. REv. 212, 240 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Starrs]. For an example of present
state inadequacy in existing Kentucky consumer laws, see Note, Can the Kentucky Con-
sumer Ever Forget Caveat Emptor and Find True Happiness? 58 Ky. L.J. 325, 336-347
(1970).
51. Note, supra note 50, at 354 n.160; Note, Consumer Protection and the Pro-
posed "South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act," 22 S.C.L. REv. 767, 780 (1970).
52. Dole, supra note 36, at 1015-16; Note, supra note 50, at 354.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750-84. See also Reed, Legislating for the Consumer:
An Insider's Analysis of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAc. L.J. 1 (1970).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)-(p).
55. Note, supra note 50, at 354-55.
56. Id. at 355.
57. See Comment, supra note 8, at 425-26.
58. ORE. REv. STAT. H§ 83.010-.190 (1964).
59. Id. H§ 83.510-.680 (1969).
60. id. §H 646.210-.230.
61. Id. §H 646.605-.990.
62. In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965), the Court said
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finite variety of deceptive trade practices cannot offer meaningful pro-
tection to its citizens.
At least ten states-Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York and North Dakota-have
adopted the Consumer Fraud Law.6" Although this law contains suf-
ficiently broad coverage for the consumer,64 it allows only the state
attorney general to bring an action, 5 thus denying to injured consumers
any private right of action. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, while allowing private litigants injunctive relief, also makes no pro-
vision for recovery of damages by injured consumers.60
To summarize, most state statutes provide partial coverage at best.
Those states with comprehensive legislation often do not permit their
citizens to sue for private relief. The result is that, on a nationwide
basis, the consumer often has a right without a remedy-or no right
at all.
3. State Agencies
State institutions, such as the offices of consumer counsel and spe-
cial agencies under the states' attorneys general have also proven to be
generally ineffective. Although over one half of the states have special
offices for consumer protection, 67 "some municipalities and states
have no consumer protection program, and others have consumer fraud
programs in name only.""8
One author has suggested that courts could take judicial notice of
the inability of the states' attorneys general to cope with the ever-
that "the proscriptions in § 5 are flexible," and that section 5 is "to be defined with
particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business," quoting from FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1952). In Rice, New Private
Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 MAss. L.Q. 307, 308
(1969), the author discusses the enactment of a statute modeled after section 5 and
says the precedent to be followed is to implement "the flexible consumer-oriented
principles used in the interpretation of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act."
63. Note, supra note 50, at 355 n.164.
64. Note, supra note 50, at 355; see Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa
Consumer Fraud Act, 54 IowA L. REv. 319, 325 (1968).
65. Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed "South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act," 22 S.C.L. REv. 767, 780 (1970). For example, IowA CODE § 713.24
(3) (1966) states that the remedies of the Consumer Fraud Act are available "[wihen
it appears to the attorney general that person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is
about to engage in any practice declared to be unlawful by this section ... .
66. Dole, supra note 36, at 1017.
67. An Act to Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, 7 H.Iv. J.
LEGIs. 122, 124 (1969).
68. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COm-
MISSION 52 (1969).
May 19711 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT 1275
increasing evidence of fraud in the consumer field. "9 In Kentucky, for
example, the attorney general has authority to enforce only three stat-
utes that directly protect consumers: (1) the Advertising and Whole-
sale Act; (2) the Going Out of Business Act, and (3) the Chain Mer-
chandising Act.70 If a consumer seeks redress for a violation of any
other law, "the Attorney General's Office can only offer its services in
mediation and hope for voluntary cooperation by the respondent com-
pany."'
1
The Better Business Bureau, where most knowledgable consumers
first bring their complaints,72 is also unable to deal adequately with
many of their problems.73 Indeed, it has even helped defeat consumer
protection legislation in the name of "voluntary self-regulations" for
businessmen."4 Mrs. Sylvia Siegal, executive director of the Associa-
tion of California Consumers, has said that the Better Business Bu-
reau "can't be expected to do a complete job. It essentially is set up to
protect business.""1 A critic in the San Francisco office of the Federal
Trade Commission concluded: "The Better Business Bureau in concept
and execution has one basic flaw: it is set up to serve the needs of busi-
ness, not the needs of the consumer. '76
B. The Federal Trade Commission
At present, only the FTC can institute proceedings under section 5
of the FTCA. Major criticism of the FTC has been both widespread
and continuous, from Henderson's treatise in 192477 to the ABA's
Commission studying the FTC in 1969.78  Richard Posner, a former
staff attorney of the FTC and member of the ABA Commission in-
69. Starrs, supra note 50, at 226.
70. Note, supra note 50, at 340.
71. Id. at 341.
72. Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL AnD BRIEFCASE, 143, 147 (1965).
73. Comment, supra note 49, at 404-09; see Note, supra note 50, at 340.
74. Comment, supra note 49, at 409.
75. Streeter, Better Business Bureau Is Busy, San Francisco Sunday Examiner &
Chronicle, Feb. 14, 1971, § B, at 13, col. 1.
76. Id. at col. 2.
77. G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) [hereinafter cited
as HENDERSON].
78. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSSION To STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]. See also COMMISSION ON ORGANI-
ZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS, app. N (1949) [hereinafter cited as HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT];
NADER REPORT, supra note 9; Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal
Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1964); Elman, A Modest Proposal
for Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Elman]; Posner,
The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Posner].
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vestigating the FTC, summarized these critical works: "What is re-
markable about these studies, which span a period of 45 years, is the
sameness of their conclusions. ' 79  He went on to assert that the FTC
was generally
rudderless; poorly managed and poorly staffed; obsessed with
trivia; politicized; all in all, inefficient and incompetent. And-the
persistence of these criticisms would seem to indicate-largely im-
pervious to criticism.80
The chief criticism of the FTC is that it has failed to provide ef-
fective planning and coordination within the agency."' The result is a
lack of discrimination in the selection of cases that involve questions of
public importance"2 and an inordinant amount of time spent on
trivial matters. Lack of planning, moreover, has produced an over-
crowded FTC docket. Thus months and even years may pass between
the filing of a complaint and the rendition of an effective decision. 4
This general lack of efficiency has been traced to the failure of officials
to provide effective leadership,88 which failure has also caused a down-
ward trend in activities while budget and staff have increased.8 6
It has also been charged that the FTC has become an inactive
agency 87 with little actual contact with the consumer.88 Indeed, be-
cause of the deficiencies in its methods of gathering data, 9 it is
doubtful that the FTC is really aware of the problems of the con-
sumer. The commission relies largely on consumer's complaints for in-
79. Posner, supra note 78, at 47.
80. Id.
81. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 12.
82. HoovER COMBEssIoN REPORT, supra note 78, at 128; NADER REPORT, supra
note 9, at 43-49.
83. HENDERSON, supra note 77, at 337; HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 78, at 128; ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 9; NADER REPORT, supra note 9, at
165; Auerbach, supra note 78, at 393.
84. HENDERSON, supra note 77, at 331; ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 15.
One example, although not altogether typical, is the Holland Furnace case where the
initial complaint was in the early 1930's and the final order was not upheld until 1965.
In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965); see Comment, supra note
49, at 444-45. See also Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548 (1964).
85. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 13. Philip Elman, former FTC Commis-
sioner, has said of FTC Commissioners: "As long as I can remember, Presidents have
said-and have been reminded by every new study and report-that revitalization of
the agencies must begin by appointing better commissioners.... While the generally
poor quality of agency appointment is indeed appalling, we should not be surprised
that it is a fact and will probably continue to be, no matter who is president." Elman,
supra note 78, at 1047.
86. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 1.
87. HoovER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 128.
88. NADER REPORT, supra note 9, at 121-22.
89. Id. at 164.
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formation, but since it cannot recover monetary damages for aggrieved
parties, they have little incentive to report unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.90 Because of the resulting diminution of complaints, the FTC
has become "preoccupied with technical labeling and advertising of
the most inconsequential sort."'"
The FTC's lack of real power contributes to its inability to provide
meaningful protection for the consumer. The FTC has
no power of its own to imprison, fine or assess or award damages.
Its maximum authority is to issue an order to "cease and desist,"
and even this order can be appealed within 60 days after it is is-
sued.92
Also, even when the order to cease and desist is issued, the FTC per-
mits the offender to comply voluntarily.93  Occasionally, the commis-
sion will verify compliance by requiring the violators to file compliance
reports. However, this report merely affirms that the offender has
ceased the prohibited unfair trade practice and has taken measures to
prevent recurrence.9 4
Finally, much of the FTC's activity benefits corporations, trade
associations or unions. 95 The ABA Commission has said: "Often the
[FTC] has seemed more concerned with protecting competitors of an en-
terprise practicing deception rather than consumers. "96
It seems evident that basic, structural modifications are necessary
to revitalize the FTC. As Philip Elman, a two-term member of the
FTC, observed in 1970, the
chronic unresponsiveness and basic deficiencies in agency per-
formance are largely rooted in its organic structure and will not be
cured by minor or transient personnel or procedural improve-
ments.97
C. Need for Effective Protection
The obvious result of this ineffectiveness of the FTC and existing
state remedies is quite apparent: those who are most in need of pro-
90. Id.; Posner, supra note 78, at 70, 88.
91. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 2.
92. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HERE IS YOUR FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 4
(1964); see Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1035
(1956).
93. NADER REPORT, supra note 9, at 57-58, 61.
94. Id. at 64-65.
95. Posner, supra note 78, at 86-87; see HENDERSON, supra note 77, at 174-75.
But, says Elman, when the FTC does take a stand against a large industry, "the agency
will stand naked and alone when it takes a controversial action impinging on powerful
private interests, as the Federal Trade Commission discovered when it promulgated its
cigarette labeling rule in 1964." Elman, supra note 78, at 1047.
96. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 37.
97. Elman, supra note 78, at 1045.
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tection are least protected.09 Consumers, especially the poor, are not
aware of the FTC;99 nor is the FTC always cognizant of the consumer's
problems.100 Because many of the FTC officials believe that the in-
dividual needs of the consumer should be protected by the state and
local agencies, they often decline to exercise the FTC's power.
101
However, as explained above, the states with their inadequate legislation
and general inability to regulate consumer fraud also fail to adequately
protect the consumer.
The Kerner Report emphasized that current laws are not designed
to protect the rights of most low-income consumers. 102 Indeed, it has
been concluded that the collective exploitation of consumers con-
tributed greatly "to the sense of alienation, tension and frustration that
made rioting and civil unrest a stark reality in our cities."'0 3  Clearly,
new remedies are necessary, and it is submitted that a private right of
action under section 5 of the FTC would enable the consumer to re-
dress many of his grievances.
Private Litigation Under Section 5
A consumer seeking to invoke the protection of section 5 of the
FTCA would be confronted with two threshold questions: (1) Do the
federal courts have jurisdiction over the consumer's claim? (2) Would
a private litigant have standing to sue under a statute which is silent
concerning the right of an individual to seek relief under it?
A. Jurisdiction
A federal court would have jurisdiction over a claim for private
relief under section 5 of the FTCA. Section 1337 of title 28, United
States Code, provides:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating com-
merce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
monopolies.
In United States v. Basic Products Co. 0 4 the court indicated that Con-
gress enacted the FTCA under the exercise of its constitutional power
98. See Baum, The Federal Trade Commission and the War on Poverty, 14
U.C.LA.L. REV. 1071 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Baum].
99. Id. at 1073.
100. NADER REPORT, supra note 9, at 164.
101. See Baum, supra note 98, at 1073. See also Baum, The Consumer and the
Federal Trade Commission, 44 J. URBAN L. 71 (1966).
102. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER 274-77
(N.Y. Times ed. 1968).
103. Kass, S. 2589 and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Comparison of
Consumer Protection, 37 GEo. WASH. L REv. 1131 (1969).
104. 260 F. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1919).
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to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Thus, it is clear that
there is subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, this statute does not
require a minimum amount in controversy to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion.1 °4 a As a result, consumers will not be precluded from suing
under section 5 because their damages total less than $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 .1°4b
That the FTCA nowhere mentions a private remedy for damages
should not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. In Bell v. Hood,1 °'
for example, the plaintiff claimed damages for a violation of his rights
under the Fourth and Fifth amendments. Although neither the Con-
stitution nor Congress had provided for this type of remedy, the Court
held that there was federal jurisdiction over the cause of action.10 6 The
Court added that the only prerequisite for federal jurisdiction is that
the complaint seek recovery under the Constitution or laws of the United
States."0 7  Thus, an action brought under section 5-a law of the
United States-would confer jurisdiction on the federal district court.
Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief can be
granted is a question of law which would be decided after the court
assumes jurisdiction.'
B. Standing
Once the court asserts subject-matter jurisdiction, it would then be
asked to hold that the plaintiff-consumer has standing to sue under a
statute which merely provides: "Unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
unlawful." A consumer's claim for relief under this statute would
come within both the framework of the "case or controversy" require-
ment of the United States Constitution, and the criteria for standing
established by recent decision of the United States Supreme Court.
The modern federal concept of standing has been primarily de-
veloped in the cases of Baker v. Carr,'019 Flast v. Cohen' ° and, most
recently, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp."' In Baker v. Carr"' the Court held, inter alia, that voters had
104a. Springfield Television, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 428 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir.
1970).
104b. To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court over cases involving federal
questions or diversity of citizenship, the plaintiff must allege that the amount in con-
troversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1964).
105. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
106. Id. at 681-82.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 682.
109. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
110. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
111. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). A companion case decided the same day is Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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standing to claim that the malapportionment of their state legislatures
violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The
Court said the crux of standing is whether "appellants alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that con-
crete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues . . .
and whether "[they] seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an in-
terest of their own, and of those similarly situated.'- In Flast v.
Cohen"r5 the Court used language as general as that in Baker. The
Court, holding that a taxpayer had standing to attack the constitution-
ality of a federal statute on the ground that it violated the establishment
and free exercise clause of the first amendment,11 6 declared:
Thus in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdic-
tion, the question of standing is related only to whether the dis-
pute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary con-
text and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial reso-
lution.'17
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp,"18 decided in 1970, the Court posited the following criteria to
determine standing in federal courts: (1) Has the plaintiff alleged that
the challenged action caused him injury, economic or otherwise?" 9
(2) Is the interest sought to be protected by the complainant arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question?' 2 6
Although the case concerned standing to appeal the order of an
administrative agency, the test established is capable of general appli-
cation.' 2 ' This same test would apparently be as applicable to a con-
sumer seeking a private right of action under the FTCA. Under these
criteria, it is clear that a consumer would have standing to sue, for he
113. Id. at 204.
114. Id. at 207.
115. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
116. Id. at 85.
117. Id. at 101.
118. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
119. Id. at 152.
120. Id. at 153.
121. In Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970), for example, the
plaintiff, arguing that he had standing to sue under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. 78a-78jj (1964), used the Data Processing test. In the course of its opinion,
the court said: "In the context of a plaintiff seeking to invoke a remedy afforded by
section 10(b) of the Exhcange Act and Rule lOb-5, '[tlhe first question is whether
the plaintiff alleges that the chalenged [conduct] has caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise. . . .' The second question is whether 'the interest sought to be
protected by the complaint is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected' by
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 805. The court in Herpich quoting Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970).
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would be faithfully and accurately alleging both that: (1) the unfair
or deceptive act or practice had caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise; and (2) he was within the "zone of interests" to be protected
within the meaning of the FTCA.
C. Right to Sue Where a Statute is Silent
Although the FTCA does not specifically create a right of private
action and previous decisions have found that only the FTC can insti-
tute a proceeding under section 5, there is ample analogous precedent
for a federal court to hold that consumers can bring an action for
private relief under the act. Many federal statutes which neither confer
nor deny the right to bring a private action have been judicially inter-
preted to grant this right to members of a class which the statute was
intended to protect.
In 1916, for example, it was held a private party may bring an
action under the Safety Appliance Acts,' 22 which provided only for
penal sanctions.' 23 In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Ringsby124 the
Court allowed an employee to recover for an injury caused by a defec-
tive handhold on a railroad car.' 25 The Court said that, although the
acts included no right of private relief
the safety of employees and travelers is their principal object,
and the right of private action by an injured employee, even
without the Employers' Liability Act, has never been doubted.' 26
The Court added that violation of the statute had resulted "in damage to
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."' 1 7
The Court then applied the common law rule that such a statute implied
a private remedy.' 28
This rationale has been followed in the cases in which the statute,
in effect, imposed a duty upon the defendant. If a breach of that duty
has injured one of the class to be protected by the statute, courts will
permit a private action. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,29 in which senders
of telegraphic messages brought suit under the Communications Act,130
122. 45 U.S.C. §§ 8-10 (1964).
123. Id. § 13.
124. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 39.
127. Id.
128. "'So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit
of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for
his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said
law.' (Per Holt, C.J. Anon., 6 Mod. 26, 27.)" Id. at 39.
129. 162 F. 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
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and Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 31 wherein pas-
sengers of air carriers sought recovery under the Civil Aeronautics
Act,13 2 affirmed judgments for the plaintiffs even though the acts did
not provide for damages. In both cases, the plaintiff were members
of a class protected by the relevant statute. Both courts held that, in
the absence of a contrary implication, a statute enacted for the protec-
tion of a specified class should also be construed to permit a private
remedy.
In Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States 3 the Supreme
Court held that section 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,13
which prohibited the voluntary or negligent sinking of a vessel, per-
mitted the government to recover the cost of removing the sunken ship,
although the act provided only for penal sanctions.' 35 The Court said:
We do not believe that Congress intended to withhold from the
Government a remedy that ensures the full effectiveness of the
Act. We think we correctly divine the congressional intent in
inferring the availability of that remedy from the prohibition of
§ 15.136
In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engine-
men' 7 the Court held that the Railway Labor Act 88 granted a rail-
way employee the right to sue the defendant Brotherhood for its failure
to represent all employees in the craft without regard to race. The
Court found that the federal statute, which permitted a majority of em-
ployees of a particular class to select an organization for representa-
tion' 39 condemned the Brotherhood's conduct.140  The Court then
stated:
The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemna-
tion, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nev-
ertheless to be derived from it and the federal policy which it
had adopted.' 41
Thus, although the courts determine the extent to which the statute
131. 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956).
132. Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, §§ 404, 902, 52 Stat 993, 1015 (1938), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374(b), 1472(a) (1964), formerly 49 U.S.C. §§ 484(b)
622(a).
133. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
134. 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1964).
135. Id.
136. 389 U.S. at 204.
137. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
138. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
139. Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National Mediation Bd., 135 F.2d 785,
796 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
140. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210,
213 (1944).
141. Id., quoting Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940).
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was to be implemented, their decisions must give effect to the congres-
sional intent of providing protection to a particular class. Applying this
rule to the construction of section 5, courts should attempt to carry
out the intent of Congress, which was to protect the large consumer class
by imposing a duty of those engaged in commerce to refrain from unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. 14 2  The above cases sug-
gest that a breach of this duty to consumers should render the violator
civilly liable to a member of the protected class.
Permission of a private remedy would also result in a more sys-
tematic enforcement of the act. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak'43 the Su-
preme Court held that the purpose of section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934111 was "to prevent management or others from
obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or
inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."' 45  The petitioner, J.I.
Case Co., emphasized that Congress had made no specific reference to
a private action under the Securities Exchange Act.'46 The Court said,
however, that "broad remedial purposes are evidenced in the lan-
guage"'47 of section 14(a). After holding that shareholders of the pe-
titioner's company had a right to sue for damages under section 27 of
the act' 4 8 for a violation of section 14, the Court, using language that
could be applied to section 5 of the FTCA, declared:
While this language makes no specific reference to a private right
of action, among its chief purposes is "the protection of investors,"
which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result.
. . . The damage suffered results not from the deceit practiced on
him [the investor] alone but rather from the deceit practiced on the
stockholders as a group. . . . Private enforcement of the proxy
rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As
in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil dam-
142. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
143. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person, by
the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his
name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other
than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title."
145. 377 U.S. at 431. In Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787
(2d Cir. 1951), the court said that, although section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act did not explicitly authorize a civil remedy, "[since . . . it does make 'unlawful'
the conduct it describes, it creates such a remedy." See also Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
146. 377 U.S. at 431.
147. Id. at 431-32.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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ages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the
enforcement of the proxy requirement ...
We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.' 49
Private enforcement of the FTCA deceptive trade practices could sup-
plement the commission's attempt to provide effective protection. The
right of consumers to institute private actions would be an effective
weapon to combat unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
As a further example, in Allen v. State Board of Elections,'50 the
Supreme Court held that private parties could sue in the federal court' 5 '
to have new state voting laws declared unenforceable under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.152 The Voting Rights Act did not explicitly grant
private parties the right to bring an action, but the Court stated:
The achievement of the Act's laudable goals could be severely
hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend solely
on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General.
. . . The Attorney General has a limited staff and often might
be unable to uncover quickly new regulations and enactments
passed at the varying levels of state government ...
. . . The guarantee of § 5 that no person shall be denied the
right to vote for failure to comply with an unapproved new enact-
ment subject to § 5, might well prove to be an empty promise un-
less the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement
of the prohibition.' 53
The federal judiciary has failed to realize, however, that section 5
of the FTCA can be effectively enforced only by private litigants.
The FTC, with its limited staff, is presently unable to regulate the com-
plex field of consumer fraud. Thus, just as a denial of a private action
under the Voting Rights Act would render it less effectual, a continued
denial of a private remedy under section 5 makes the entire act an
"empty promise" for the consumer.
Finally, in Goldstein v. Groesbeck,154 the court of appeals granted
private relief under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,155
holding:
149. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
150. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
151. "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person: ... (4) To recover damages or to se-
cure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights, including the right to vote." 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-73 (Supp. m, 1967).
153. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969).
154. 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1964).
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[W]e think a denial of a private right of action to those for whose
ultimate protection the legislation is intended leaves legislation highly
pubilcized as in the public interest in fact sadly wanting, and even
delusive, to that end.156
The protection offered by the FTCA, although described in the "inter-
est of the public,"' 5 7 in fact provides no meaningful consumer protec-
tion. A denial of a private right of action leaves the protection af-
forded by the FTCA largely illusory. The paradoxical result is that the
FTCA can protect the public only if private parties can bring actions
under section 5.
Advantages of a Private Right of Action
Numerous consumer advocates have agreed that a private right of
action would best serve the interest of the consumer. Private actions
are especially effective against deceptive acts or practices that endanger
health or safety when recovery of large damages is possible. 8  With-
out a private remedy, the consumer may not be able to obtain relief. 59
Phillip Elman, an FTC Commissioner for two terms, maintains
that:
When only private interests are aggrieved, the proper remedy is
private action in the courts. A tort, whether the victim is a com-
petitor or a consumer, is a private, not a public wrong-and the
place to seek relief is in a court, not a regulatory agency ...
Just as the administrative process should not be used to insulate
businessmen from the rigors of a free enterprise economy, it should
not be used to relieve the courts of their duty to redress violations
of private rights. 160
The Harvard Journal of Legislation recommended a private right
of action under a statute modeled after section 5 of the FTCA, arguing
it was both more economical and more effective to encourage the
consumer to seek private redress' and adding further:
By allowing the aggrieved consumer to take legal action to obtain
156. 142 F.2d at 427.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
158. Posner, supra note 78, at 65; see Comment, Public and Private Consumer
Protection in New York, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 326, 331 (1970).
159. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Trans-
action Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 607 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rice]. Compare
Kripke, Gestures and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 46
(1969), where the author says: "The state cannot undertake to represent private parties
in individual litigation, and the knowledge of this sometimes makes the state an appar-
ently less successful informal mediator than a nonpublic spokesman....
This and the absence of assured vigorous public enforcement leave and will al-
ways leave a continuing need for private enforcement."
160. Elman, supra note 78, at 1046.
161. An Act To Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, 7 HaRv. J.
LEGIs. 122, 147 (1969).
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convenient and speedy redress, Part D [private legal recourse]
avoids either (1) creating a "bottleneck" where only a limited
number of consumers will get the protection they deserve or (2)
forcing the expenditure of tax dollars for a larger attorney general's
office to do much that the consumer, if given the opportunity, could
do himself.162
Finally, private consumer suits could, if successful, be used as
leverage for obtaining voluntary compliance from offenders in the
future.6 3 Because of the fear of further litigation, it is likely the con-
sumer would be successful in forcing the violator to comply with sec-
tion 5. The FTC, of course, has not had such success.'
Conclusion
The present interpretation of section 5 of the FTCA, permitting
enforcement only by FTC action, does not give to the consumer the
protection that Congress had intended to provide. It is evident that
present state laws and agencies do not afford the consumer adequate
relief from unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. A uni-
form federal deceptive trade practices law is necessary to enable con-
sumers to redress their grievances. Section 5 is a sufficiently broad
statute to provide adequate protection for the consumer.165 Its chief
merit lies in its "extraordinarily flexible statutory grant . . . to deal
with unfair or deceptive acts or practices."' 66  Because it is a federal
law, it can be used to combat consumer frauds that reach across state
lines; in such situations, existing state and local laws are often ineffec-
tive. 67 Furthermore, there is ample case law that has given meaning
to the broad phrases of the act."6 " At the same time, because the act
is broadly worded, the litigant is not required to plead and prove all
the elements of fraud or deceit.
Although it is true that the courts have denied a private right of
action under section 5 in all cases, it is also true that they have not
examined the question since the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ment, which manifested the intent of Congress to make the FTCA suf-
162. Id. at 147. The ABA Commission studying the FTC also felt some form of
private relief for an injured consumer was a necessity to protect him from the varied
instances of fraud. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 2.
163. Rice, supra note 159, at 606-07.
164. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
165. See Rice, New Private Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chap-
ter 93A, 54 MAss. L.Q. 307 (1969), in which the author outlines the advantages of a
recently enacted statute modeled after section 5 but expressly providing for a private
right of action.
166. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 52.
167. Id.
168. See note 62 supra; see Note, Consumer Protection in North Carolina-The
1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 904-05 (1970).
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ficiently broad to cover all possible injuries to the consumer." 9 It is
important to note that
Congress wanted a phrase that carried no historical impediments,
one that the courts could not impair by reading into it a historical
gloss that would square it into a rigid, unyielding mold; it wanted
an "elastic" term that, like those of the constitution itself, would
embrace not merely trade practices known in 1914, but those yet
to be discovered by future generations of "rogues." 170
The courts' present interpretation is forcing the FTCA into an
unyielding mold. Paul Rand Dixon, former Chairman of the FTC,
said of the original FTCA legislation:
[T]he draftsmen of the new legislation concluded that if the new
policies were to be made fully effective, their administration had to
be placed, at least in the first instance, in the hands of an impartial,
nonpartisan body of men thoroughly experienced in the intricacies
of commerce, with more flexible machinery at their disposal than
the judicial system could offer.' 71
The FTC is not, however, a nonpartisan body.172  Nor are its
administrators "thoroughly experienced in the intricacies of commerce."
It can only be concluded that private consumers should be allowed to do
for themselves what the FTC and other state agencies have not done:
provide protection from those who would take advantage of the con-
sumer's economic and political weakness to exploit him.
Allan Bruce Currie*
169. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
170. MacIntyre & Dixon, The Federal Trade Commission after 50 Years, 24 FED.
BAR J. 377, 385 (1964).
171. Id. at 385.
172. See Elman, supra note 78, at 1046-47.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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